Battle of Xiangshuikou

The Battle of Xiangshuikou was a battle fought between the s and the communists in northern Jiangsu during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era, and resulted in a communist victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his nationalist regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to allow the communists, who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China, to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus control the Japanese-occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and keep their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese-occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the nationalist troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the nationalists.

However, it must be noted that most of these former nationalists turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were nationalists in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These warlords were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the nationalist camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined the nationalists, because such a move would have alienated other factions within the nationalist ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the nationalists to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his nationalist regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Nationalist strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the nationalists would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the former nationalist turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these warlords and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These warlords and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those nationalists who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these warlords would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these warlords and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

Communist strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the nationalists because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like in that of the nationalists. The communists had already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the nationalists withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Battle

On September 18, 1945, the 10th Brigade of the 3rd of the communist New Fourth Army with the help of local communist militia launched their assault in the Xiangshuikou region of Jiangsu, China, after the nationalist garrison consisted of four battalions refused to surrender. The nationalist battalions were the former nationalists turned Japanese puppet regime force rejoined nationalist after World War II, and they were ordered by Chiang Kai-shek’s regime to hold on the land they controlled, and not to surrender to the communists, and fight off communists if necessary until Chiang could deploy his own troops to the region. However, these units were no match for their long time communist adversary, and just like previous battles during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were easily defeated without popular support, with nearly all of the force totaling over a thousand being wiped out by the attacking enemy. As the few remaining survivors fled, they left behind important cities and town to the enemy, including Xiangshuikou , Chen Family’s Port , Guanyun and Guannan . The communist victory ensured their total control of the region along the Guan River, and the important cash generating salt production fields in northern Jiangsu.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the warlords in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the warlord problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

Battle of Tangtou-Guocun

The Battle of Tangtou-Guocun was a series of clashes between the s and the s during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era in Jiangsu, China and resulted in the communist victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.

However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

The Battle

After those former nationalist-turned Japanese puppet regime force had rejoined the nationalists after the end of World War II, they refused to surrender to the communists, the only Chinese force in the region according to Chiang Kai-shek’s order. This had obvious lead to numerous clashes with the communists and the local population that strongly supported the communists, and eventually the full scale battle between the two sides erupted in December, 1945.

The communist 7th Column of the New Fourth Army and the Independent Brigade of the communist Central Jiangsu Military District joined their forces in attacking the positions held by the former nationalist-turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the nationalist, and with strong popular support, the communists easily overwhelmed their nationalist adversary and by the time the battle concluded in the end of December 1945, over sixteen major cities, towns and vast area along the highway from Yangzhou to Taizhou, Jiangsu including Yiling , Embankment Head and the Village of Guo had fallen into communist hands.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

Battle of Shaobo

The battle of Shaobo was a battle fought in the Shaobo region in central Jiangsu, and it was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II, and it is a prelude to Gaoyou Campaign. The battle resulted in communist victory was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.

However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Battle

The 7th Column of the New Fourth Army launched its offensive against the Japanese and their puppet regime force that refused to surrender station at the town of Shaobo of Jiangdu County of Jiangsu province on December 19, 1945. By December 21, the battle was over with communist victory. The communists managed to have killed more than 110 Japanese troops, over 100 troops of Japanese puppet regime troops, capturing over 40 Japanese troops and over 550 troops of Japanese puppet regime force. In addition, the poorly equipped communists also captured one heavy machine gun, one infantry support gun and over 300 rifles.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

The communists did not have the dilemmas faced by the s and enjoyed popular support, and thus was able to easily overwhelm their adversary, and thus achieving victory without much difficulty. Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, the political gain was much greater than the military one for the communists as result of this battle.

Battle of Rugao

The Battle of Rugao was a battle fought between the s and s for the control of town of Rugao in Jiangsu province during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era, and resulted in the communist victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.

However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

The Battle

After the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces who rejoined the nationalists after World War II had refused to surrender to the communists, the only Chinese force in the region under the order of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, unit of the communist New Fourth Army from the 4th Sub-Military Region of the communist Central Jiangsu Military Region launched its offensive in Rugao, Jiangsu, China against these units. Unable to fend off the communist attack and without any popular support from the local populace, the entire nationalist Independent Brigade of the Second Front Army garrisoning Rugao totaling more than 3,000 was completely annihilated, everyone including the commander Kong Ruiwu and the deputy commander Li Ruisheng was either killed or captured alive. Additionally, the communists also succeeded in capturing two , twenty-two machine guns, and more than 2,600 other firearms.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

Battle of Rugao-Huangqiao

The Battle of Rugao-Huangqiao was a battle fought between the and the during the Chinese Civil War in the post World War II era and resulted in communist victory. The battle was a one seven major battles in Central Jiangsu Campaign.

Order of battle
*Nationalists
**A regiment of the 79th Brigade
**99th Brigade of the Reorganized 69th Division
**The 160th Brigade
**The 187th Brigade
**The Reorganized 25th Division
*Communists
**The 1st Division
**The 6th Division
**The 5th Brigade
**The Specialized Regiment

After battles fought at Dingyan and Linxin in Central Jiangsu Campaign, the communists had severed the Rugao – Nantong Highway, and the nationalist 187th Brigade defending Rugao was isolated. To avert the situation, the nationalist 99th Brigade of the Reorganized 69th Division was ordered to be deployed from the Yellow Bridge Town to reinforce Rugao. Meanwhile, the nationalist Reorganized 25th Division deployed at Yangzhou and Jiangdu was ordered to attack Shaobo in the north. The communist, in response, ordered their 1st Division, 6th Division, 5th Brigade and the Specialized Regiment to attack Taizhou, Jiangsu from Dingyan and Linxin regions, in the hope of luring the nationalist Reorganized 25th Division to abandon its attack on Shaobo and reinforce Taizhou, Jiangsu, so that it could be ambushed on its way. Although the communist plan succeeded in forcing the nationalists to abandon their attack on Shaobo , the planned ambush of the nationalist Reorganized 25th Division failed to materialize. Instead, the nationalist 99th Brigade of the Reorganized 69th Division became the unfortunate victim.

In the morning of August 25, 1946, the nationalist 99th Brigade of the Reorganized 69th Division begun its march toward Rugao from Yellow Bridge Town, with nationalist 187th Brigade and a regiment of the nationalist 79th Brigade coming out of Rugao to meet their comrades-in-arms. By the noon, the nationalist 99th Brigade of the Reorganized 69th Division met the communist main force on the road from Yellow Bridge Town to Rugao. The communist 1st Division and 6th Division immediately launched their assault on the nationalists, successfully besieging the enemy in isolated pockets in the regions of Fenjie and Jiali . The communists decided to concentrate their forces 4 to 5 times than that of their enemy to annihilate the weakest enemy first, and then the stronger one.

On August 26, 1946, the nationalist 99th Brigade of the Reorganized 69th Division at Fenjie region was first to be completely annihilated, and on the next day, the nationalist 187th Brigade and a regiment of the nationalist 79th Brigade at Jiali region was also annihilated completely. The victorious communists then launched their assault on Yellow Bridge Town, and remaining 5 companies of the nationalist 160th Brigade simply could not challenge the overwhelmingly superior enemy force, and gave up the town and surrendered. With the fall of Yellow Bridge Town, the nationalists was forced to cease their offensive to regroup for the next stage of the campaign and the battle ended.

Battle of Huaiyin-Huai'an

Battle of Huaiyin-Huai'an is also called by the Campaign to Defend Huaiyin-Huai'an by the Communist Party of China, and it was a struggle between the s and the communists for the control of Huaiyin and Huai'an, the two richest cities in China during the Chinese Civil War in the post World War II era, and resulted in the victory.

Order of battle

*Nationalist order of battle
**The 7th Army
**Reorganized 26th Division
**Reorganized 28th Division
**Reorganized 69th Division
*Reorganized 74th Division
*Communist order of battle
**The 5th Brigade
**The 13th Brigade
**The 9th Column
**Communist force from Shandong

First Stage

After the Battle of Si County, the nationalists redeployed the Reorganized 74th Division and a brigade of the reorganized 26th Division to Huaibei from Huainan, and by the middle of August 1946, the nationalists had taken regions including Chaoyang Village and Temple Mountain Yu . On August 19, 1946, the nationalist of the region, Chen Cheng, held a military conference at Xuzhou, and decided the nationalist strategy of the next stage: 4 nationalist divisions under the command of the nationalist commander Li Yannian would push eastward across the Tianjin-Pukou Railway in Huaibei. On August 21, 1946, the nationalists begun their push toward Suining , Xiuqian , and Taier Village .

On August 26, 1946, Chen Yi telegraph the communist high command to report the three options for the communist force from Shandong under his command to fight in Huaibei: First, the 2nd Division, 7th Division and the 8th Division of the communist force in Shandong would attack the nationalist 28th Army. Second, the communist force in Shandong would regroup at Siyang and the eastern bank of the Grand Canal of China to have a month long break. Third, all of the communist force in Shandong would go south to join forces with the communist force under Su Yu’s command to concentrate their forces. Chen Yi and his subordinates preferred the second option because they could strike in north, south or west when they wanted. The communist high command telegraphed back on August 29, claiming that the nationalists had struck eastward across the Lanzhou-Lianyungang Railway and thus threatened Huaiyin and Linyi, so it was impossible to for the communist troops to rest for a month continuously. The communists would be in a bad position if they were not to actively engaging the enemy. The communist force from Shandong under the command of Chen Yi should strike eastward to Suining region and fight enemy, and then rest for a short period, and repeat the process, so that morale would remain high. September was a good time to engage the enemy and the communist force under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping and the communist force under the command of Li Xiannian had all wished your corporation . If there was no battle, then the enemy would gain more lands, and thus further boost their morale, and our morale would suffer as a consequence. Therefore, we must engage the enemy to decrease their morale and increase ours by annihilating a regiment or a brigade a time, and after five or six times, the situation would turn for the better for us.

In accordance with the order from the communist high command, the communist force from Shandong under the command of Chen Yi regrouped to the east of Suining in attempt to ambush the advancing nationalists, however, their plan was foiled by the skillful and careful nationalists who would not provide any opportunities for the enemy by concentrating their forces. Both side subsequently had to cease their operations due to heavy rains that followed and by the end of August, 1946, the communist force from Shandong under the command of Chen Yi withdrew to the east of Siyang to regroup and re-supply. By the beginning of September, 1946, the nationalist Reorganized 69th Division and the Reorganized 74th Division stopped its advance at Xiuqian and Suining regions while two divisions of the nationalist 7th Army stopped its advance at Oceanic River and Ling River regions to the north of Siyang . Mother Nature had imposed an intermission that both sides were forced to accept.

Second Stage

The intermission caused by heavy rain had provided the opportunity for the communists to rethink their strategy, but unfortunately, the new strategy formed lead to the eventual communist defeat in the campaign. On September 4, 1946, Chen Yi provided three options for the next move for his communist force in Shandong. The first option was to move to Shuyang in the north to face the incoming nationalist Reorganized 74th Division and 69th Division thus securing the link to southern Shandong, but this would leave only the communist 9th Column to defend Huaiyin, which was obviously not enough. The second option was to strike the town of Oceanic River to fight the nationalist force of the New Guangxi Clique, which would be at least two divisions strong, but this would not worth it. The third option was to wait, if the of nationalist forces of the New Guangxi Clique came to attack, then they would be ambushed, and if not, then the communist forces from Shandong under Chen Yi ’s command would wait until Chiang Kai-shek’s force to begun their eastward push, and then strike north to fight Chiang’s forces.

Su Yu and his political commissar Tan Zhenlin were concerned about the next move their comrades would make, and from September 5 thru September 7, 1946, they had sent four telegraphs to Chen Yi , strongly recommending that his communist force from Shandong should remain in Huaiyin and Shuyang regions so that the communists could concentrate their forces to ensure victories. On September 7, 1946, Chen Yi personally reached Huai'an to discuss the situation with Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng , the communist party bosses in Jiangsu and central China, and reached the following conclusions: The communists needed several victories badly and it was possible to achieve victories in Huaibei, so in September and October, communist forces in Huaibei would attempt to alter the situation for the better. On the same day, the communist force from Shandong under the command of Chen Yi received order to move to regions including Si County, Xiuqian and Shuyang to defend off the possible nationalist attack on Shuyang from Suqian , or the possible nationalist attack on Huaiyin from the town of Oceanic River , and the troops begun their new deployment on September 8, 1946.

Su Yu and his political commissar Tan Zhenlin strongly opposed the new troop deployment by Chen Yi and on August 8, 1946, they sent two telegraphs to Chen Yi and his colleagues to voice their concern. The first was to ask not to take Hai’an so that their troops could have ten days to rest and regroup, and then move to Siyang to stop the nationalist forces of New Guangxi Clique in order to stabilize the situation in central China. . The second telegraph sent by Su Yu and his political commissar Tan Zhenlin to Chen Yi accurately pointed out the plan Chen Yi was ordered to follow was in fact a disaster because when the communist forces were deployed in the regions between Suqian and Shuyang , it would in fact allow the nationalists easily taking the regions along the Grand Canal of China and Huaiyin-Huai'an region, thus forcing the communist force from Shandong to return to where it was originally from. Meanwhile, the communist force in Jiangsu lost their base, and were surrounded by the nationalists from three sides, and thus forced to cross the Yangtze River into the south when supply run out. If Chen Yi still had to follow the order by deploying the majority of the troop in the north, then the communist 2nd Column under commander Wei Guoqing must be retained in the region to check the nationalist southward advance. Otherwise, Su Yu and political commissar Tan Zhenlin could not be responsible for the situation .

The pleas from Su Yu and political commissar Tan Zhenlin were rejected by Chen Yi , who telegraphed back on August 9, 1946, claiming that the situation has changed and the nationalist 7th Army had moved southward to regions including Lingbi , Siyang , Xiuqian and Suining and its original defense perimeter was filled by other nationalist units. The communist should wait for several days to see if the nationalists would move eastward, and if so, the communists would ambush them in regions including Xin'an County, Shuyang and Xiuqian . Otherwise, the communists would attack westward into the region of Suining and Xiuqian , so that the communist standing in Southern Shandong, Shuyang , Huaiyin and Huai'an would remain favorable, and Su Yu still should direct his force to take Hai’an . After receiving this telegraph from Chen Yi , Su Yu and political commissar Tan Zhenlin made one last attempt to avert the Chen’s decision by telegraphing back on the same day, claiming that the situation for the communist in Huaibei was not optimistic and both Huaiyin and Huai'an were threatened, so taking Hai’an should not be a priority, and their troops should be give up the mission and turn northward to defend Huaiyin and Huai'an. However, before they could exchange anymore telegraphs with Chen Yi , the rapid nationalist advance had turned the table against the communists, just exactly as Su Yu and political commissar Tan Zhenlin had feared.

Third Stage

The nationalist assault was with lightning speed that was completely unexpected by the enemy: on August 10, 1946, the nationalist Reorganized 28th Division and the Reorganized 74th Division struck the regions of the town of Oceanic River and Storage Village and threatened Huaiyin directly. Chen Yi was forced to readjust his troop deployment again: the communist 5th Brigade and the 13th Brigade in central Jiangsu were ordered to Huaiyin to help the communist 9th Column to set up a defensive line along the southern bank of the Grand Canal of China, the communist forces attacking Hai’an abandoned their original plan and turned to Huaiyin to reinforce the threatened city. On September 12, 1946, the nationalist 7th Army crossed the Grand Canal of China and took Siyang , approaching Huaiyin. On September 13, 1946, the nationalist Reorganized 74th Division attacked from the right flank of the nationalist 7th Army, taking the Yuan Family’s Village and Xu Family’s Village the communist 9th Column. Rao Zijian , the deputy of the communist 9th Column personally lead the communist 75th Regiment counterattacked, but without any success and the defenders’ perimeter was limited to the pier.

On September 15, 1946, the nationalist Reorganized 74th Division attacked the pier on the eastern bank of the Grand Canal of China, and by the evening, had successfully driven the defenders consisted of the communist 9th Column and the communist 13th Brigade from the positions, taking the pier and adjacent Yang’s Family’s Village . Pi Dingjun , the communist commander of the 13th Brigade gravely underestimated the nationalists when he reached Huaiyin with the 1st Regiment of the communist 13th Brigade, and ordered each of three regiment of the 13th Brigade would have two of their battalions sent out to counterattack the nationalists. The idea was strongly opposed by the communist commander of the 2nd Regiment of the 13th Brigade, Zhong Fasheng , who reached the city earlier and fought with the nationalists and thus was well aware their adversary’s potent capability. Zhong Fasheng claimed that the 1st Regiment reached the city by noon and was aware of the situation and geography while the 3rd Regiment just got to the city, so it would be better for the communist 1st Regiment and the 2nd Regiment to fight and the 3rd Regiment would act as reserve, but his suggestion was rejected by Pi Dingjun , the commander of communist the 13th Brigade. As a result, the communist 13th Brigade launched a total of nine assaults on the nationalist Reorganized 74th Division which had crossed the Grand Canal of China, but all were beaten back, suffering over 600 casualties, the heaviest ever for the 13th Brigade. A total of four nationalist brigades from the Reorganized 74th Division and the Reorganized 28th Division attacked the city in two waves under the cover of air bombardment and artillery shelling, while the communist reinforcement from Shandong were successfully checked by the nationalist 7th Army. In the riverine region in the south, the communist reinforcement was stopped by nature: due to the heavy rain and lack of boats, the communist reinforcement was completed stopped.

The failure of the communist counterattack meant that the defenders’ days were numbered when they were pushed to the edge of the city wall. Before the dawn of September 19, 1946, two companies of the nationalist Reorganized 74th Division crawled passed the defenders’ perimeter at the junction of the position of the communist 9th Column and the position of the communist the 5th Brigade, reached the gate of the city, and after capturing a sentry alive, they had successfully obtained the password. In the heat of ensuing battle, the two companies of the nationalist troops were able to enter the city from the southern gate by disguising as the communist troops outside the city wall going back into the city for re-supply. During the precise moment in the ensuing battle at the dusk, the nationalists inside the city opened the gate and the defenders had no choice but to abandon the city as the attacking nationalists entered the city en mass. On September 21, communists abandoned Huai'an after fierce fights and on the next day, the nationalists declared the city was secured. Although the nationalists had suffered over 14,000 casualties in taking the region, it was only a drop in the bucket and the reward was far greater. The communist reinforcement from Shandong withdrew to Lianshui region upon hearing the news of the fall of the cities, ending the battle.

Outcome

The nationalist victory resulted in a great blow to the morale of the enemy when Huaiyin, the capital of the communist base in central Jiangsu was taken by the advancing nationalists. Some nationalists blamed the communist failure on the communist leader Mao Zedong for that he had made the same mistake Chiang Kai-shek would have made in the latter stage of the Chinese Civil War by interfering with the local command with impractical strategic objective, but this was a subject of debate remain to this day: there were many communist commanders participated in this battle who insisted on Mao was right due to the following reasons: The lost of Huaiyin and Huai'an region, which was the economic center of central China where industrial and commerce were concentrated meant that the no more supplies could be provided to the communist forces. Furthermore, all of the communist bases in central and northern Jiangsu were lost as a consequence because the natural barriers that would help to defend these communist bases such as Lake Hongze, Lake Gaoyou , and Grand Canal of China were in nationalist hands when Huaiyin – Huai'an region was lost by the communists. The collapse of the communist bases in northern and central Jiangsu as a consequence of the fall of Huaiyin – Huai'an region meant that the rural area as a rich source in grain production and providing soldiers was no longer within the communist grasp.

On the other hand, many communists also supported Su Yu for his decision to disengage the nationalist to withdraw because although the consequences of giving up the region was severe, the peasantry communist force at the time simply was no match to the elite mechanized nationalist forces attacking them and certainly did not have any capability to annihilate their nationalist adversary either. If the region was to hold at all cost, it might well be the communists themselves be completely annihilated. In fact, after the battle, the nationalists were so confident that they no longer encrypted their messages in their radio communications so that their every move was known by their communist enemy, yet the communists chose to avoid direct confrontation with the nationalists despite this advantage, because they were well aware that they were not strong enough at the time. To defend the city to the death just because the region was the heart and capital of the communist base would be disastrous for the communists. As the unexpected political fallout, this became an excuse to struggle and criticize Su Yu decades later during the Cultural Revolution what he had done in this battle.

Battle of Dazhongji

The Battle of Dazhongji was fought between the s and the s during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era in Jiangsu, China and resulted in the communist victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.

However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

The Battle

After those former nationalist-turned Japanese puppet regime force had rejoined the nationalists after the end of World War II, they refused to surrender to the communists, the only Chinese force in the region according to Chiang Kai-shek’s order. This had obvious lead to numerous clashes with the communists and the local population that strongly supported the communists, and eventually the full scale battle between the two sides erupted in the beginning of September, 1945.

The clashes was concentrated around the Great Central Village , an important town of Dongtai, Jiangsu and the communist units of the New Fourth Army of the communist Central Jiangsu Military District first took the outposts outside the Great Central Village , and finally launched the final assault on the town on September 13, 1945. After fierce battle, the town fell on the same day and the entire garrison, the nationalist 7th Brigade was completely annihilated, with majority of the troops killed, including the commander, Gu Zhenzhi , while the surviving 1,500 were captured alive by the attacking enemy.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

Battle of Changzhou

Battle of Changzhouthe classic street fighting inner city and last battle after battles of recovered 20s cities in whole Jiangsu province by Why Army.
This battle was historical because the first big scale of used Rifles in China.

Background

After the Suzhou Massacre POW Incident, Huai Army‘s last target city in Jiangsu was Changzhou, there were over 80,000 Taiping army vowed never surrender,and famous general Cheng Xuechi dead, that have become the largest tough challenge from raised Huai Army in 1858.

110,000 were the Huai Army total strength that no any prepare strength and Li Hongzhang command them to frontline the first time in person, he layed stress on this battle very.

Before this battle that 40,000 Taiping forces and families at least across Pacific Ocean by ships escaped to the Americas, maybe this reason that Chinese named the sea means Taiping Yan from then.

Battle of Jintan

Christmas military meeting

Li Hongzhang very worry about this battle because Taiping bought many rifles and none Cheng Xuechi helpful first, Li happened convened whole generals discussed and decided how to fight thus key battle in Christmas 1863. Li selected Christmas this day maybe summon part of Taiping troops religion Christianity to surrender and hope Jesus could pardon guilty battle coming soon.

Borrow general:from Xiang Army

Lieutenant General Bao Chao was belong to Xiang Army, Li please Bao Chao reinforce and directed Huai Army, and Bao led 20,000 Xiang Army combat with famous tough Taiping Li Shixian in Jintan.

Aftermath

In 17 April Bao Chao led Xiang Army pretend retreated and troops hidden in Mao Shan, 20,000 Taiping army out Jintan 25km follow Xiang Army and fallen trick, defeated by Bao Chao‘s Xiang Army in Mao Shan. Xiang Army recovery Jintan and Taiping commander Chen Jueshu was KIA on 25 April.

Also Li spends 50,000 taels hired the Ever Victorious Army, but this act seemed made Bao Chao unhappy that feel gave Xiang Army too cheaper, so Xiang Army leaved after recovery Jintan.

Decisive battle

Rifle‘s walls:face to face

On 11 May morning, Huai Army used Explosive material broken the city wall, thousands Huai Army ran into city, but thousands the Taiping troops arrange many walls took their Rifles shoot Huai Army and Huai Army also shoot them each other. then front soldiers fallen then back supply immediately, scene very bloody and cruel before the machine gun raised 1890s. Both them no any hidden places just known stand up so deaths very seriously.

Distance 10 Metres!

This sadness made because them each others less used rifles experiences, lead to mistake of early infantry tactics.All they forgotten use rifles not used knives long time ago that made their distance so near and soldiers look like jam on every city‘s streets bloody. 　

Arrested Chen Kunshu

Chen Kunshu was a Kung fu master, when Huai Army surround his home none door that a Senior Colonel Gong yangsen was a Kung fu master too be volunteer, climbed high wall and inner boxer fighting with Chen and arrest him at last.

Recovery: Just 4 years

The Chinese calendar that day was lose Changzhou in 1860 and recovery same month and day after 4 years, that made Qing‘s officials very excited and thought its god‘s help .

Battle of Baoying

The battle of Baoying was a battle fought at the Baoying region in central Jiangsu, and it was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II. The battle was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era, and resulted in victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.

However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Order of battle

Nationalists
*106th Regiment of 42nd Division of the 5th Army
*Baoying Security Regiment
Communists
*Units of Central Jiangsu Military Region
*Baoying Independent Regiment

Battle

On August 21, 1945, the 13th Brigade of the 5th Division of the communist New Fourth Army decided to take the town of Baoying in central Jiangsu by force after the local defenders consisted of former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II refused to surrender. The battle begun on August 15, 1945 and the attacking communists were soon succeeding in taking all enemy strongholds outside the town. A week later, the communists succeeded in breaching the defense of the town at the night of August 22, 1945. By the next day, the defenders were completely annihilated, with the deputy regimental commander captured alive along with most of his troops by the attacking communists. In addition, the communists also captured more than 60 machine guns and over 600 firearms, and the vast stretch of 100 km along the Grand Canal of China from Gaoyou to Huai'an had fallen to the communist hands.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist government.

Yangzhou riot

The Yangzhou riot of August 22-, 1868 was a brief crisis in Anglo-Chinese relations during the late Qing Dynasty. The crisis was fomented by the of Yangzhou who opposed the presence of foreign in the city, who claimed that they were legally residing under the provisions of the Convention of Peking. Threats against the missionaries were circulated by placed around the city. Rumors followed that the foreigners were stealing babies and killing them to make medicine.

The riot that resulted was an angry crowd of Chinese estimated at eight to ten thousand who assaulted the premises of the China Inland Mission in Yangzhou by looting, burning and attacking the missionaries led by Hudson Taylor. No one was killed, however several of the missionaries were injured as they were forced to flee for their lives.

As a result of the report of the riot, the British consul in Shanghai, took seventy Royal marines in a Man of war and steamed up the Yangtze River to Nanjing in a controversial show of force that eventually resulted in an official apology from the Chinese government under Viceroy Zeng Guofan and financial restitution made to the C.I.M. as well as the restoration of the house that they had purchased in the city. Hudson Taylor and other Christian missionaries in China at that time were often accused of using gunboats to spread the gospel. However, none of the missionaries had requested or desired the military intervention.

Prelude

There was an orphanage in Yangzhou operated by a French Roman Catholic where a number of infants had died of natural causes. However, this fueled the rumors that Chinese children were disappearing.

Marshall Broomhall later noted regarding the cause of the riot:


About two weeks before the riot, a meeting of the literati was held in the city, and soon anonymous handbills were posted up through out the city containing many absurd and foul charges. These handbills were followed by large posters calling the foreigners " Brigands of the religion of Jesus," and stating that they scooped out the eyes of the dying and opened foundling hospitals in order that they might eat the children. The Prefect had already been warned of the impending trouble, but did not take any action.

All possible conciliatory measures were adopted by the missionaries. Handbills were circulated promising the opening of the mission premises for inspection as soon as the workers had repaired the unfinished walls and removed the scaffolding which would be dangerous to a crowd.

The riot

When the riot broke out the following members of the China Inland Mission were in Yangzhou : Mr. and Mrs. Hudson & Maria Taylor with four children , Miss Emily Blatchley, Miss Louise Desgraz, Mr. and Mrs. William David Rudland, and Messrs. George Duncan and Henry Reid.

On Saturday, August 22, two foreigners came over from Zhenjiang to spend a few hours sight-seeing in the city, and almost immediately the city was full of wild rumors about the disappearance of as many as twenty-four children. By 4 P.M. the Mission premises were besieged. Messengers were dispatched to the Prefect, but with no effect. The passions of the crowd were growing, and at last, when the attack upon the premises had become full-scale, Mr. Taylor and Mr. Duncan determined to face the mob and try and make their way personally to the Yamen.

Mr. Taylor and Mr. Duncan, after having been badly stoned, reached the Yamen in an exhausted condition to find the terrified gatekeepers closing the gates; the doors gave way before the pressure of the mob when the missionaries rushed into the judgment hall crying Kiu ming! Kiu ming ! , a cry to which any official is bound to attend at any hour, day or night. They were kept waiting in an agony of suspense for forty-five minutes before they saw the Prefect, and then only to be provokingly asked, " What do you really do with the babies ? " ; this interview was followed by another agonizing delay of two hours before they learned that help had been sent, though even then they were told on their way back that all the foreigners left in the house had been killed.

Those left in the mission house feared that the two who had faced the mob had been torn to pieces. When the house was set on fire from below the children and women had to be lowered from the upper story, and Mrs. Taylor and Miss Blatchley with their escape
cut off had to jump, both were seriously injured. Mr. Reid was nearly blinded for life by being struck in the eye with a brick when trying to break Mrs. Taylor s fall.

That any of the party escaped to tell the tale was little less than a miracle. However, the whole party of missionaries, several of whom were severely wounded and weak from the loss of blood, were enabled on Monday, August 23, the anniversary of little death, to journey down to Zhenjiang, where they were cared for.

Aftermath

On their way down to Zhenjiang the missionaries passed the Assistant British Consul and the American Consul on their way up. The Consular Authorities proceeded to investigate the situation personally, and reported their findings directly to William Henry Medhurst, the British Consul at Shanghai. Mr. Medhurst made prompt demands for reparation. Proceeding with an escort to Yangzhou he demanded that the Prefect should accompany him to Nanjing that the case might be judged before the Viceroy. The Prefect begged to be allowed to go in his own boat and not as a prisoner, and this was agreed to upon his furnishing his written promise not to escape. This he readily gave, yet fled under cover of darkness.

Even so, Mr. Medhurst proceeded to Nanjing with the gunboat Rinaldo as escort. In the course of the negotiations, which promised to terminate satisfactorily, the captain of the gunboat took ill and left for Shanghai. With the withdrawal of the gunboat the aspect of affairs immediately changed, and Mr. Medhurst had to depart diplomatically at a loss. This failure led Sir Rutherford Alcock to authorize Consul Medhurst to renew his demands, this time backed by a naval squadron. The Viceroy Zeng Guofan speedily came to terms, and appointed two deputies to proceed to Yangzhou and hold an enquiry. A proclamation was thereupon issued which secured the reinstatement of the mission, compensation for damages to property, and moral status in the eyes of the people by
stating that " British subjects possess the right to enter the land," and that " Local Authorities everywhere are to extend due protection."

The British Foreign Office sharply criticized Medhurst and Alcock for having used gunboats to extract concessions from the Nanjing Viceroy. This was contrary to the British policy of holding the central government of China - not local governments - responsible for enforcing the commercial treaties and the safety of foreign residents in China. The incident prompted foreign secretary Lord Clarendon to officially censure Medhurst and Alcock for the actions, and to reiterate the policy of the to seek redress from Beijing whenever foreigners were attacked.

The British press reacted critically of the missionaries working in China and blamed them for causing a crisis in Sino-British relations. There were heated debated in the British Parliament about whether missionaries should be allowed to continue to live abroad in China away from the Treaty Ports.


Maria Taylor was among those who defended the actions of the China Inland Mission in the wake of the riot. She wrote to a friend in England:



On November 18 the Taylors were reinstated in their house at Yangzhou by the British Consul and the Taotai from Shanghai, who had come up as the Viceroy’s deputy. For some time Yangchow became the home of Mr. and Mrs. Taylor despite the efforts of some high-placed officials to eject them. The Governor of Zhenjiang, however, personally purchased the mission premises from the anti-foreign landlord a high military official named Li.

Xinghua Campaign

The Xinghua Campaign consisted of two battles fought between the communist New Fourth Army and the Kuomintang, the forces of the former . The campaign took place during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era, and resulted in a communist victory.

Prelude

Like similar clashes following WWII between the communists and the nationalists in China, the Xinghua Campaign stemmed from Chiang Kai-shek's realization that his nationalist regime had neither sufficient troops nor adequate transportation to move his army into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Chiang feared that the communists, who already dominated much of rural China, would further expand their territories by being the first Chinese faction to accept the official Japanese surrender, thus adding the regions occupied by Japan to the area controlled by the communists. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their wartime puppet regime not to surrender to the communists, and furthermore to quell unrest and fight off the communists until the eventual arrival of the nationalist troops.

One result of the Xinghua Campaign was that most of the members of the Japanese-installed puppet regime rejoined the nationalists, whom they had deserted following the earlier Japanese victory over the nationalist army. These former nationalists consisted mostly of Chinese and their private armies, only nominally under Chiang Kai-shek’s control before and after WWII. The warlords felt no loyalty to a cause greater than their own, and had defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep some of their former power in exchange for their collaboration.

Although the warlords' lack of loyalty and independence from the nationalist power structure posed a great threat to Chiang, he recognised that they needed to be handled with delicacy. Moving against the warlords would alienate other factions within the nationalist ranks and would deprive Chiang of soldiers who could garrison nationalist territory. These manned garrisons would allow Chiang's own troops to fight the communists.

The Nationalists' Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and exterminate communism, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the nationalists would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops to hold off the communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem that plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced; at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights, and Chiang's own troops would have an easier time taking control.

Warlord armies' honor

The former nationalist forces had no problem following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, as they were eager to prove themselves. These warlords and their troops were well aware that due to their collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were very hated by China's general population, especially by those nationalists who had refused to surrender to the enemy and had fought the enemy until the eventual victory. The warlords and their armies would certainly be disarmed and discharged, at best, and possibly completely eliminated. Thus, they saw Chiang Kai-shek’s order for them to fight the communists as a way for them to legitimize themselves and retain their power.

Communists' strategy

The communists' strategy was much simpler than that of the nationalists because there were no significant division within the communist ranks, as there were with the nationalist ranks. The communists had already earned considerable popular support by being the only remaining regional Chinese force to continue fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the nationalists withdrew. Further, because the communist-established bases in rural regions were more prosperous, compared to those of Japanese-occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists better deserved to represent China and to regain control over the regions formerly occupied by the invaders.

Campaign

Chiang Kai-shek allowed the former nationalists to rejoin his army. The former nationalists were given the instruction to fight the communists until the arrival of Chiang’s troops. The city of Xinghua, located in central Jiangsu, was guarded by the nationalists. The Japanese puppet regime force rejoined the nationalists, totaling more than 7,000, including the 22nd and local security regiments. The communist New Fourth Army was determined to take the city, and amassed units from the communists' Central Jiangsu Military District.

The communist units began to enter the positions for attack starting on August 26, 1945 and were ready two days later. On August 29, the first battle of the campaign began. The communists started to take nationalist positions along the outskirts of the city. The defenders were soon forced to abandon their strongholds outside the city wall and retreat into the city. At 8:00 pm on August 31, the assault on the city itself began, and under cover from mountain guns, the communists soon breached the city's defenses and penetrated the city. By the end of the following day, after fierce street fighting, the city fell into communist hands, concluding the Xinghua campaign.

The entire nationalist garrison of Xinghua was decimated. Out of the 7,000 defenders, around 2,000 were killed. The remaining 5,000, were captured alive, including the commander of the city's defense and of the Kuomintang's 22nd division. Also captured were 64 artillery units, 122 machine guns, and 3,324 repeating rifles, in addition to other weaponry and provisions. The communists' loss was extremely light in comparison: only 49 killed, and 325 wounded, including 40 officers wounded.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve China's long-standing warlord problem and to exterminate communism proved to be a critical mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, reducing the power of the warlords in the region, the positive impact of any secondary objectives were negated by the loss of primary ones. The people of the region had already blamed the nationalists for the previous loss to the Japanese invaders, and the reassignment of the former nationalist forces to fight the communists only further alienated the local populace and strengthened popular resentment of Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

Taixing Campaign

Taixing Campaign was a series battles fought at the Taixing region in central Jiangsu, and it was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II. The campaign was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era, and resulted in victory.

Order of battle

Nationalists
*Temporarily Organized 19th Division of the 2nd Army
Communists
*Units of Central Jiangsu Military Region
*Local militias

Campaign

On September 8, 1945, units of communist Central Jiangsu Military Region assisted by the local militias decided to take the town of Taixing in central Jiangsu by force after the local defenders consisted of former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II refused to surrender. Three days later, all nationalist strongholds outside the town had fallen into communist hands. At night of September 11, 1945, the communists launched their assaults on the town itself, and by 8:00 AM next morning, the communist secured the town after capturing more than four thousands defenders alive, including the commander Cai Xinyuan . In addition, the communists also captured 12 artillery pieces, over 140 machine guns and more than 2,700 firearms.

Suzhou Massacre POW Incident

The Suzhou Massacre POW Incident, was an incident involving the Huai Army led by Li Hongzhang in Suzhou, when the Taiping Army 200,000 surrendered to Li Hongzhang on May 6, 1863, but Li ordered killing about 10,000 POWs on the Temple of two towers in Suzhou.

Huaiyin-Huai'an Campaign

The Huaiyin-Huai'an Campaign was a campaign consisted of several battles fought between the s and the communists during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era, and resulted in communists taking the city of Huaiyin and the city of Huai'an. Sometimes this campaign is separated into two by the communists as Huaiyin Campaign and Huai'an Campaign respectively.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.

However, these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independence. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Order of Battle

*Defenders: order of battle :
**The 28th stationed at Huaiyin
**Huaiyin Security Regiment stationed at Huaiyin
**Three brigades stationed at Huai'an
*Attackers: communist order of battle :
**The 3rd of the New Fourth Army
***The 7th brigade
***The 8th brigade
***The 10th brigade
***Sheyang Independent regiment
***Huai'an Independent regiment
***Eastern Lianshui Independent regiment
***Huaiyin Garrison regiment
***Lianshui Garrison regiment

First Stage

The communist 10th brigade of the 3rd of the New Fourth Army begun its push toward Huaiyin on August 26, 1945 from regions of Gaoliang Ravine and Jiang’s Dam , while five communist local regiments coordinated their attacks from other directions: the communist Sheyang Independent regiment, Huaiyin Garrison regiment and Lianshui Garrison regiment attacked Huaiyin from the east and north, while Huai'an was attacked by the communist Huai'an Independent regiment and the Eastern Lianshui Independent regiment. After fierce battles that lasted four days from August 27, 1945 – August 31, 1945, all positions outside the city wall had fallen into the enemy hands and the city of Huaiyin was surrounded.

After besieging the city, the enemy force did not immediately attack, but instead, made preparations by building fire support stations and digging trenches that extended all the way to the foot of the city wall. The fire support stations were built by creating hills higher than the city wall with earth so that they would also serve as reconnaissance platforms and everything inside the city was under the attacking enemy’s surveillance.

Second Stage

After the defenders refused to surrender, the final assault on the city begun in the afternoon on September 6, 1945 at 2:00 PM. Taking the advantage of the trenches, the attacking enemy succeeded in approaching the foot of the city wall and set explosives to blow up a section of the city wall near the eastern gate. The was unable to stop the enemy from rushing in from the collapsed section and after one and half hour fierce battle, the entire garrison of Huaiyin consisted of the 28th and the Huaiyin Security Regiment totaling more than 8,600 men were annihilated by the enemy. Pan Ganchen , the commander of the 28th was among the 300+ defenders killed, and another 8,328 was captured alive, included the of the 28th , Liu Shaoshen . The enemy also succeeded in capturing 7 artillery pieces, 88 machine guns, and 6,592 repeating rifles from the . The last resistance ended at 5:30 AM next day on September 7, 1945.

After the fall of Huaiyin, the communist 10th brigade of the 3rd of the New Fourth Army turned its attention to Huai'an, besieged the city on September 13, 1945. Two days later, on September 15, 1945, the commander of the communist 3rd of the New Fourth Army, Huang Kecheng personally led the 7th brigade and the 8th brigade of the communist 3rd of the New Fourth Army to Huai'an, replacing the 10th brigade of the communist 3rd of the New Fourth Army in preparation to attack the city with the help of local communist militia. Realizing their desperate situation, the defenders attempted to breakout on the dusk on September 21, 1945, but was beaten back by the enemy.

The assault on Huai'an begun in the morning of September 22, 1945 at 8:00 AM. Under the cover of heavy artillery support from and infantry support guns which included captured , the attacking force succeeded in breaching the defense of the city, and the 12 metre high city wall proved to be incapable of stopping the enemy, which was breached within 5 minutes. By 10:00 AM, most of the defending force was annihilated. However, the remaining defense of a group of more than 200 ardent s lead by the brigade commander Wu Shuquan and the civilian commissioner Li Yunpei was much stronger than anticipated and it took attackers 5 hours to wipe out this last group of defenders and mop up the rest who went into hiding. The three-brigade strong defending force of Huai'an was completely annihilate by the attacking enemy with more than 300 killed, including the commander Wu Shuquan , and another 4,350-men captured alive, while 5 artillery pieces, 52 light mortars, 50 machine guns and 3,738 repeating rifles also fell into the hands of the enemy. Along with the previous loss of Huaiyin and positions outside the two cities, the defenders lost nearly 14,000 troops, nearly the entire fore.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s inChina, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the s were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in s’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

In contrast, the communist victory of taking the two cities resulted in the linking up of the previous four separate communist bases in central Jiangsu, northern Jiangsu, north of Huai River and south of Huai River. The political fallout of Chiang Kai-shek’s fatal mistake of attempting to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together also greatly helped the communists in gaining popular support in the region.